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Abstract—This paper focuses on the combined effects of loss 
factors and zonal pricing in a system that takes as a starting 
point the procedures of transmission pricing in the Norwegian 
power system. It interprets the notion of loss factors in an AC 
power flow model, and develops a method for finding zonal 
prices consistent with a restricted AC optimal power flow. The 
effects of decomposing the nodal prices to find a loss factor to 
cover the marginal cost of losses, and letting the congestion 
management be resolved by zonal prices based on a DC 
approximation of the flows, are evaluated by comparing the 
resulting net prices to those of an optimal AC power flow (AC-
OPF). 
 
Index Terms—Congestion management, deregulated 
electricity markets, optimal power flow, loss factors, nodal 
pricing, Nord Pool, Norwegian power market, pool model, 
transmission pricing, zonal pricing. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
he pool model has been realized in different ways in the 
numerous countries that have deregulated their power 
sectors. Thus, there are marketplaces where locational 
marginal prices are used, while the operation mode of other 
markets adheres to a uniform market clearing price. In 
addition, the choice between DC and AC power flow leads to 
quite different market performances. In this paper an 
operation mode parallel to that of the Norwegian electricity 
market is investigated.  
The Norwegian power market is part of a larger 
international deregulated marketplace, the well-known Nord 
Pool [1], [2]. After the eastern part of Denmark joined Nord 
Pool in 2000, the common marketplace comprises all the 
Nordic countries except Iceland. The Nordic marketplace has 
five system operators and a pool operator whose responsibility 
is the operation of the Nord Pool Power Exchange. The 
system operators in each region are shown in Fig. 1. Only 
Denmark has two grid operators. The five regional system 
operators cooperate through Nordel, an organization which 
was established as early as in the 1960s in order to support the 
power trade between the Nordic countries. 
In [3] the congestion management mechanisms of the 
Nordic countries are compared with the ones of other well-
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known liberalized markets using a unified framework. The 
generation scheduling issue in the Norwegian market is 
investigated in [4], while the electricity market reform in some 
countries, including Norway, is the topic discussed in [5]. 
Further economic investigations are given in [6], where the 
performance of energy prices in England and Norway is 
discussed considering bilateral contracts and the spot market. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In section II 
the transmission pricing methods of the Nordic market are 
described, with emphasis on the Norwegian pricing rules. 
Section III presents a novel method for the assessment of an 
operation mode like the Norwegian. Numerical examples are 
provided in section IV, pointing out the effects on the pricing 
by using zonal pricing, DC power flows and loss factors. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn in section V.  
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Fig. 1. The Nordic market 
II.  TRANSMISSION PRICING IN THE NORDIC MARKET 
At the Nordic level, zonal pricing is used for inter-zonal 
congestion while counter-trading [7] is adopted to resolve 
intra-zonal constraints. Norway may be split into two or more 
zones, whereas the areas of the other system operators have 
uniform prices. 
The other part of the Norwegian transmission pricing is the 
loss factors. The Norwegian high voltage network spans 166 
nodes. Periodically, state-owned Statnett, the Norwegian 
system operator, announces loss factors for each system node 
for a time interval of 6-10 weeks, with different prices for day 
and night/weekend. The objective of these factors is to charge 
for marginal losses. The factors are given as a percentage of 
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the load at each system node, and each participant has to pay, 
for each traded MWh, to the central grid, an amount equal to 
the loss factor of the node where the participant is located, 
times the system price. Agents that reduce losses will be 
compensated. Of course, this will affect the bids that the 
players submit to the Pool, as shown in Fig. 2, where linear 
function bids of market participants are depicted. 
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Fig. 2. The loss factors for suppliers (upper) and consumers (lower) 
 
  The upper diagram of Fig. 2 shows the bid curves of a 
supplier. The marginal cost curve is given by the solid line, 
and assuming no strategic bidding, the supplier will inject 
power into the network up to a maximum of maxP  when the 
price is maxp . When facing a positive loss factor, i.e. 
additional cost, the supplier will increase the price and so the 
new bid curve is the upper dashed line. If the loss factor is 
negative, then the supplier reduces the price, and so the new 
bid curve is the lower dashed line. The lower diagram of Fig. 
2 presents the bid curves of a consumer. In this case, a 
positive loss factor results in a decrease of power consumed 
for a given price, i.e. the lower dashed line, while a negative 
loss factor has the opposite result, which is shown by the 
upper dashed line. In any case, for both suppliers and 
consumers, the shift of the original bid curve along the y-axis 
is equal to the charge for the marginal losses. 
While losses are accounted for ex ante of bidding, 
congestion is taken care of by means of zonal pricing in the 
(day-ahead) spot market. In zonal pricing the system operator 
divides the grid into two or more zones and then runs an 
optimal power flow, taking into account the transfer limits 
between zones and requiring uniform prices for all the buses 
belonging to a given zone. Through this mechanism, the 
system operator reduces the power flow over the lines where 
the original market equilibrium led to a violation of transfer 
limits. Any remaining (intra-zonal) constraints are resolved by 
counter trading. Thus, for the Norwegian transmission pricing, 
a sequential pricing rule is adopted, starting with loss factor 
announcements, continuing with zonal pricing in the day-
ahead market, and finally counter trading if necessary. 
It is clear that different ways of dividing the grid into 
zones, and also to determine transfer limits between zones, 
lead to quite different market outcomes [8], [9]. However, in 
this paper we will focus on the decomposition of losses and 
congestion, and the effect of introducing DC power flows into 
this procedure. 
III.  FORMULATION OF LOSS FACTORS AND ZONAL PRICING IN 
AC-OPF 
The investigation of the operation mode of the Norwegian 
electricity market has been made using a complete AC-OPF. 
Both the use of loss factors and zonal pricing have been 
analyzed and interesting conclusions can been drawn. This 
section presents the necessary theoretical background in order 
to carry out this investigation. 
The following steps describe the procedure, which leads to 
the assessment of an operation mode similar to the 
Norwegian. 
Step 1: A complete AC-OPF is used. Nodal prices are 
            calculated for each node. 
Step 2: The loss component of the nodal prices is 
                computed. 
Step 3: This loss component is used as the nodal loss 
                factor. 
Step 4: The participants’ bids are modified according to the  
            loss component. 
Step 5: The modified bids are given as input in a DC-OPF. 
Step 6: New nodal/zonal prices are calculated. 
Step 7: The net price of each participant is defined by  
            adding/subtracting the loss factor from the new  
            nodal/zonal prices. 
Step 8: Comparisons are made between the original nodal 
            prices, obtained by AC-OPF, and the new net  
                nodal prices. 
A.  Loss Component 
The procedure described above indicates the need for 
computing the loss components of the nodal prices. In [11] the 
nodal prices are decomposed into two components, one which 
is due to generation and losses, and another one corresponding 
to system congestions. Further work on nodal price analysis 
can also be found in [12]. For the scope of this paper it is 
necessary to identify the part of the generation/loss component 
that is caused by the system power losses. In this it is assumed 
that the nodal price at the reference bus, which is used for the 
nodal price analysis, is due only to generation. The 
assumption of the nodal price analysis shown in [11] is that, at 
the reference bus a marginal increase of demand can be 
locally covered by the bus generator. If this hypothesis holds 
then the marginal increase of demand at the reference bus 
does not cause additional power losses. Thus, it is so that: 
0
,
=∂
∂
rL
Losses
P
P                                    (1) 
where LossesrL PP ,,  are the power demand at reference bus r 
and the system power losses respectively. Assuming that (1) is 
satisfied, one may write for the reference bus that: 
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rGrGL ,, λλ =                                  (2.a) 
0, =rLosλ                                    (2.b) 
where Gλ  is the nodal price component due to generation 
(equal for all the system buses), Losλ  is the nodal price 
component due to losses, and GLλ  is the component due to 
generation and losses. Consequently, the loss component of 
the nodal price, at any system bus i, is given from the 
following equation: 
rGiGLiLos ,,, λλλ −=                           (3) 
B.  Zonal Pricing 
A major characteristic of the Norwegian market operation 
mode is the use of zonal pricing as congestion management 
tool. The same tool is used in the Nordic market for inter-
zonal congestions. In the case that zonal pricing is active all 
the nodes that belong to a zone face the same price. An 
objective of this paper is to simulate a zonal pricing situation 
within a complete AC-OPF (nodal price mechanism). The 
zonal pricing situation requires the same nodal prices for all 
nodes that belong to a zone. 
Usually, the nodal price at a bus is equal to the marginal 
cost of this bus which is given by its bid curve. That is: 
iG
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∂−= Pλ                                (4) 
where )( GK P  is the objective function of the optimization 
problem. This function consists of the total cost, i.e. cost for 
generation and cost for not covering the demand. Since the 
demand can be simulated through fictitious generators, as it is 
proposed in [11], the vector GP  includes the power 
generation of real and fictitious generators as well. Through 
the optimization procedure this objective function has to be 
minimized. iGP ,  is the power generation at bus i.  
Thus, if the aim is to obtain equal nodal prices for all the 
nodes that participate in a zone, an additional restriction must 
be put in the OPF in order to achieve this goal. This restriction 
demands that the generators of the buses, which participate in 
a zone, should operate with equal marginal cost. 
The market operator may treat the supplier bid curves, 
shown in Fig. 2, as marginal cost curves resulting from 
polynomial cost functions. Moreover, the consumer bid curves 
may be simulated through the bid curve of a fictitious 
generator. The production of this fictitious generator would 
represent the uncovered part of demand. Thus, the bid curves 
of any participant may be deduced from a polynomial cost 
function. If the bid curves of Fig. 2 are treated as marginal 
cost curves then the corresponding cost function has the 
following form: 
caPPK GG += 2)(                                (5) 
where a, and c are constants. It should be underlined, that the 
possible existence of the first-degree term in (5) would not 
have distorted the generality of the following analysis. Hence, 
the analysis is also valid for the bid curves that are given by 
the dashed lines in Fig. 2. For any generator i the marginal 
cost, resulting from (5), is: 
iGiiG PaP ,, 2)(cost marginal =                  (6) 
From Fig. 2 one may find out that the factor ia  is given by 
the relationship: 
i
i
i P
p
a
2
=                                        (7) 
where ( ip , iP ) is any corresponding pair of the bid curve. 
Consider now that in case of zonal pricing, there is a zone 
consisting of bus 1 and bus 2. Both of them are generation 
buses. If the generation limit at these two buses is not reached 
then the two generators should operate with equal marginal 
cost in order to face the same nodal price. Thus, it is: 
022
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Equation (8) is the additional restriction which has to be 
incorporated in the OPF so as to obtain the same nodal prices 
for the buses 1 and 2. Consequently, the OPF is now: 
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                              (9) 
where f are the equality restrictions for nodal power balance, g 
are the inequality restrictions of the power system and z is the 
zonal pricing restriction for the buses 1 and 2. The vector 
),,,( θVQPx GG=  consists of the active and reactive power 
generation, the voltage and the phase angle of each node. The 
Lagrange function, which corresponds to (9), is as follows: 
),()()()()( 2,1, GGG PPzKL ξ+++= xµgxλfPx      (10) 
where λ, µ and ξ are the Lagrange multipliers of the 
corresponding restrictions. At the optimal point, according to 
the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, it is: 
),()()()(0 2,1, GGG PPzK xxxx xgµxfλP ∇+∇+∇+∇= ξ      (11) 
Equation (11) facilitates the determination of a market 
equilibrium given the restriction of equal nodal prices for all 
generators participating in a zone. This common nodal price 
can be found by choosing from all the derivatives shown in 
(11) the ones with respect to 1GP  and 2GP . The derivatives of 
g with respect to these two variables will be either zero (for 
the voltage, reactive production and power flow limits) or the 
corresponding multiplier µ will be zero for the active 
production limit since it is assumed that this limit is not 
reached for these two generators. Thus, it is so that: 
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From both (12a) and (12b) it is obvious that the price 
which has to be adopted as the common nodal price for the 
buses 1 and 2 is expectedλ . This price is equal to their common 
marginal cost and so it will be accepted by both participants. 
It is important to underline that now the Lagrange 
multipliers 1λ  and 2λ  cannot be used as nodal prices for the 
buses 1 and 2. Both (12a) and (12b) point out that 21,λλ  are 
different than the corresponding bid of the two producers, 
which is equal to the expectedλ . However, it can be shown that 
there is a fixed relationship between 21,λλ  and expectedλ . 
By multiplying (12a) by 12 / aa  and then adding it into the 
(12b) it is: 
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Equation (13) can be generalized for n generators 
participating in a zone as follows: 
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Consequently, the common marginal cost expectedλ  is the 
weighted average of the Lagrange multipliers iλ . At this point 
it should be underlined that (14) holds if the production limits 
of generators participating in a zone are not reached. If such 
limits are reached then (14) is affected by the corresponding 
Lagrange multiplier µ. However, it is necessary to mention 
that (14) is not needed in order to calculate the common 
marginal cost. This aim is served by the additional restriction 
introduced into the OPF. Once the power output of a generator 
participating into a zone is obtained, as co-product of OPF, 
the marginal cost can be estimated from the bid curve of this 
generator. The usefulness of (14) is in showing that there is a 
standard relationship between the Lagrange multipliers of the 
buses belonging to a zone, and their common marginal cost, 
given that the production constraints are not active.  
IV.  NUMERICAL EXAMPLES 
The analysis which is presented in Section III provides the 
necessary methods in order to assess a stepwise market 
operation mode like the Norwegian. The use of these methods 
will be highlighted using a 10-bus test system which is 
illustrated in Figure 3. The market, which is represented by 
this system, consists of four suppliers and four consumers. 
The participants’ bids have the form which is shown in Fig. 2. 
The network data as well as the necessary data for the market 
players’ marginal cost and benefit functions are given in the 
Appendix, Tables A1 and A2. Four different cases will be 
studied through subsections A to D. 
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Fig. 3.  10-bus test system. 
 
The assessment of the operation mode consists of 
calculating the deviations between the nodal prices obtained 
by AC-OPF and the prices that would be obtained if the 
system operates similar to the Norwegian market, with a 
sequential approach to transmission pricing, relying on ex ante 
announcement of loss factors and computing zonal prices 
based on adjusted bids and a DC computation of the flows. 
The loss factors are given directly in ct/kWh and not in % of 
the nodal price. The latter is also given when randomly chosen 
factors are used. All computations have been carried out with 
MATPOWER [13]. 
A.  Unconstrained System 
In case A, it is assumed that there are no binding 
transmission constraints in the system. Following the 
procedure of section III, nodal prices are calculated, assuming 
bids are provided to a market operator according to the 
marginal cost data of Table A2, and that the market operator 
runs an AC-OPF.  
 
TABLE I 
CASE A – UNCONSTRAINED WITH LOSS FACTORS FROM AC 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal price 
AC 
1 2.9296 -0.0234 2.9174 2.9408 0.0112 
2 2.9527 -0.0003 2.9174 2.9177 -0.0350 
3 2.9427 -0.0103 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0150 
4 2.9565 0.0035 2.9174 2.9139 -0.0426 
5 2.9633 0.0103 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0356 
6 2.9526 -0.0004 2.9174 2.9170 -0.0356 
7 2.9530 0.0000 2.9174 2.9174 -0.0356 
8 2.9609 0.0079 2.9174 2.9408 -0.0201 
9 2.9683 0.0153 2.9174 2.9177 -0.0506 
10 2.9680 0.0150 2.9174 2.9277 -0.0403  
 
 5
In Table I, second column, the calculated nodal prices (in 
ct/kWh) are presented. To find the outcome of the stepwise 
pricing procedure, it is necessary to define a set of loss 
factors, and it is assumed that the market operator adopts the 
loss components of the nodal prices as defined in section III, 
as loss factors. Here, the loss factor is given directly as real 
number and not as % of nodal price. Bus 7 is used as 
reference bus since the nodal price of this bus is at the middle 
of the price spectrum, implying positive as well as negative 
loss components. Moreover, at bus 7 a generator with large 
capacity is located. 
TABLE II 
CASE A – UNCONSTRAINED WITH RANDOM LOSS FACTORS 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as 
% of 
nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal 
price AC 
1 2.9296 0.1465 +5 2.9707 2.8242 -0.1054 
2 2.9527 0.0591 +2 2.9707 2.9116 -0.0411 
3 2.9427 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0280 
4 2.9565 -0.0887 -3 2.9707 3.0594 0.1029 
5 2.9633 0.0593 +2 2.9707 3.0300 0.0667 
6 2.9526 0.1181 +4 2.9707 3.0888 0.1362 
7 2.9530 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0177 
8 2.9609 0 0 2.9707 2.9707 0.0098 
9 2.9683 -0.1781 -6 2.9707 2.7926 -0.1757 
10 2.9680 0.1187 +4 2.9707 3.0894 0.1214  
 
The calculated loss components are included in the third 
column of Table I. The next stage is the modification of the 
original bid curves of the players according to the loss factors, 
refer Fig. 2. The market operator then receives the adjusted 
bid curves and runs a DC-OPF. 
The resulting nodal prices are shown in Table I in the 
fourth column. Since there is no congestion, these prices are 
equal. However, the final prices that the market participants 
face result from subtracting the loss factors from the nodal DC 
prices, i.e. the net DC prices of column 5 in Table I. The 
deviations of these prices from the nodal prices of the AC-
OPF are given in the last column of Table I. It is interesting to 
note that even if there is no congestion and loss factors are 
based on the real AC situation, the DC approximation leads to 
different nodal prices than the AC-OPF, and that the 
differences in this case are of the same magnitude as the loss 
factors. 
In the Norwegian system, loss factors are computed and 
announced for periods of 6-10 weeks, and may consequently 
apply for hundreds of hourly market clearing situations. Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that, in most cases, the constant 
loss factors are not associated with the changing real AC 
situation. Therefore, we repeat the pricing procedure with a 
set of randomly generated loss factors, in the interval ± 10% 
of the nodal price, as those are the administratively 
determined limits in the Norwegian system. Table II 
illustrates, in the third column, the randomly chosen factors. 
Again the DC-OPF is run with adjusted bids, and net nodal 
DC prices are calculated. As can be seen from the last column 
of Table II, the deviations from the AC nodal prices are now 
larger. This case study reveals that even in the absence of 
congestion and zonal pricing, deviations from the AC nodal 
prices may be expected when applying a sequential pricing 
procedure. 
 
B.  Constrained System without Zonal Pricing 
If the power transfer limit of line 7-8 is equal to 94 MVA, 
the previous market equilibrium is not feasible, and the power 
flow restriction of line 7-8 is binding. In Norway, congestion 
may lead to a splitting in different zones, and zonal pricing 
will be investigated in cases C and D. However, for this 
research it is also interesting to compare the congested AC 
nodal prices with the prices obtained by the sequential 
operation mode, but without using zonal pricing, i.e. assuming 
that each bus is a zone. 
The calculated AC nodal prices as well as their loss 
components are given in Table III. The market operator runs a 
DC-OPF on the loss-adjusted bids, calculates the DC nodal 
prices, and net nodal prices are found. The differences 
between AC nodal prices and the DC net prices are given in 
the last column of Table III. A comparison of these deviations 
to the ones given in Table I indicates that in case of 
congestion, the differences are larger. 
Following the same procedure as in section A, instead of 
the AC nodal price loss components, randomly chosen loss 
factors may be used. 
TABLE III 
CASE B – CONSTRAINED WITH LOSS FACTORS FROM AC 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal price 
AC 
1 2.9340 -0.0242 2.9160 2.9402 0.0062 
2 3.1140 -0.0098 3.0620 3.0718 -0.0422 
3 3.2570 0.0026 3.1770 3.1796 -0.0774 
4 2.7890 -0.0113 2.7700 2.7813 -0.0077 
5 3.1680 0.0056 3.0920 3.0976 -0.0704 
6 3.4030 0.0144 3.2930 3.3074 -0.0956 
7 2.3800 0.0000 2.3950 2.3950 0.0150 
8 3.6250 0.0120 3.4950 3.5070 -0.1180 
9 3.5590 0.0200 3.4610 3.4810 -0.0780 
10 3.5450 0.0198 3.4130 3.4328 -0.1122  
TABLE IV 
CASE B – CONSTRAINED WITH RANDOM LOSS FACTORS 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as 
% of 
nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal 
price AC 
1 2.9340 0.0880 +3 2.9391 2.8511 -0.0829 
2 3.1140 -0.1246 -4 2.9909 3.1155 0.0015 
3 3.2570 0 0 3.0318 3.0318 -0.2252 
4 2.7890 0.0558 +2 2.8816 2.8258 0.0368 
5 3.1680 -0.0950 -3 3.0025 2.9075 -0.2605 
6 3.4030 0.1702 +5 3.0775 3.2477 -0.1553 
7 2.3800 0 0 2.7327 2.7327 0.3527 
8 3.6250 0 0 3.1579 3.1579 -0.4671 
9 3.5590 0.2135 +6 3.1432 3.3567 -0.2023 
10 3.5450 0.0355 +1 3.1247 3.1602 -0.3848  
 
The corresponding loss factors as well as the comparison 
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results are given in Table IV. It is evident that, in this case, the 
differences are essentially higher than in Table III, showing 
once more that differences are more likely to appear when loss 
factors are not associated with the real AC situation. 
 
C.  Constrained System Considering Zonal Pricing 
The third case consists of introducing modest zonal pricing 
in the previous congested case. Assume that buses 1 and 2 
form a zone, while all the other buses remain as single-bus 
zones. First, the AC nodal prices, shown in Table V, are 
calculated. The prices for buses 1 and 2 are now equal 
because the zonal pricing restriction has been incorporated in 
the AC-OPF. The loss components of these prices are given in 
the third column, and it is assumed that these components are 
announced as loss factors. Again the pool operator runs a DC-
OPF on adjusted bids, now demanding the same nodal price 
for buses 1 and 2. The resulting prices as well as the net prices 
are also given in Table V. The deviations are, generally, 
higher than in the previous case where the zonal pricing was 
not incorporated. 
By choosing loss factors different from the loss 
components, these deviations are increased, as it is indicated 
in Table VI. 
 
TABLE V 
CASE C – MODEST ZONAL PRICING WITH LOSS FACTORS FROM AC 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal price 
AC 
1 2.9956 0.0248 2.9670 2.9422 -0.0534 
2 2.9956 -0.1010 2.9670 3.0680 0.0724 
3 3.2620 0.0030 3.1740 3.1770 -0.0850 
4 2.7870 -0.0115 2.7770 2.7885 0.0015 
5 3.1720 0.0059 3.0920 3.0979 -0.0741 
6 3.4100 0.0148 3.2860 3.3008 -0.1092 
7 2.3720 0.0000 2.4090 2.4090 0.0370 
8 3.6360 0.0124 3.4850 3.4974 -0.1386 
9 3.6090 0.0204 3.4510 3.4714 -0.1376 
10 3.5540 0.0202 3.4040 3.4242 -0.1298  
TABLE VI 
CASE C – MODEST ZONAL PRICING WITH RANDOM LOSS FACTORS 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as 
% of 
nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal 
price AC 
1 2.9956 0.2097 +7 3.0150 2.8053 -0.1903 
2 2.9956 0.2396 +8 3.0924 2.8528 -0.1428 
3 3.2620 0 0 3.1533 3.1533 -0.1087 
4 2.7870 -0.0836 -3 2.9292 3.0128 0.2258 
5 3.1720 0.1586 +5 3.1095 3.2681 0.0961 
6 3.4100 0.2046 +6 3.2215 3.4261 0.0161 
7 2.3720 0 0 2.7071 2.7071 0.3351 
8 3.6360 0 0 3.3415 3.3415 -0.2945 
9 3.6090 0.2526 +7 3.3211 3.5737 -0.0353 
10 3.5540 0.0355 +1 3.2919 3.3274 -0.2266  
 
D.  Constrained System with Intensive Zonal Pricing 
The last case describes a situation where a more intensive 
zonal pricing is applied, i.e. more buses participate in some 
zones. More specifically, it is assumed that the four generator 
buses form one zone, while a second zone consists of the four 
consumer buses. Buses 3 and 8 remain single-bus zones. 
 
TABLE VII 
CASE D – INTENSIVE ZONAL PRICING WITH LOSS FACTORS FROM AC 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal price 
AC 
1 2.7780 0.0026 2.8380 2.8354 0.0574 
2 2.7780 0.0117 2.8380 2.8263 0.0483 
3 3.5860 0.0221 3.2590 3.2811 -0.3049 
4 2.7780 0.0059 2.8380 2.8321 0.0541 
5 3.9320 0.0205 3.4480 3.4685 -0.4635 
6 3.9320 0.0257 3.4480 3.4737 -0.4583 
7 2.7780 0 2.8380 2.8380 0.0600 
8 4.3500 0.0121 3.6900 3.7021 -0.6479 
9 3.9320 0.0269 3.4480 3.4749 -0.4571 
10 3.9320 0.0258 3.4480 3.4738 -0.4582  
 
The results of this case are presented in Table VII. It is 
obvious, that the price differences for the great majority of the 
buses are essentially higher than in case C. 
In case of more intensive zonal pricing, a set of randomly 
chosen loss factors may also be applied. Both loss factors and 
resulting price differences are given in Table VIII. Compared 
to Table VII, the price differences at some buses have 
increased while others are reduced. 
 
TABLE VIII 
CASE D – INTENSIVE ZONAL PRICING WITH RANDOM LOSS FACTORS 
(all prices in ct/kWh) 
 
Bus Nodal 
price 
AC 
Loss 
factor 
Loss 
factor as 
% of 
nodal 
price 
Nodal 
price 
DC 
Net 
price 
DC 
Difference: 
Net price 
DC- 
Nodal 
price AC 
1 2.7780 0.1111 +4 2.8427 2.7316 -0.0464 
2 2.7780 0.0556 +6 2.8427 2.7871 0.0091 
3 3.5860 0 0 3.1960 3.1960 -0.3900 
4 2.7780 -0.1389 -5 2.8427 2.9816 0.2036 
5 3.9320 0.3146 +8 3.3554 3.6700 -0.2620 
6 3.9320 0.2359 +6 3.3554 3.5913 -0.3407 
7 2.7780 0 0 2.8427 2.8427 0.0647 
8 4.3500 0 0 3.5570 3.5570 -0.7930 
9 3.9320 0.0786 +2 3.3554 3.4340 -0.4980 
10 3.9320 0.3146 +8 3.3554 3.6700 -0.2620  
 
E.  Discussion of the Results 
Table IX shows the social surplus, i.e. the consumers’ 
willingness to pay less the cost of production for the different 
cases considered, and also the surplus of the producer located 
in the reference bus [8], [14]. Column label AC refers to the 
prices based on AC-OPF, while DC(1) and DC(2) refer to the 
market solutions resulting from loss factors based on 
respectively, the AC loss components and randomly generated 
loss components. For each case and pricing method the upper 
number gives the social surplus, while the lower shows the 
surplus of the supplier of the reference bus. It is evident from 
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the numbers that the social surpluses are fairly stable, the 
difference between the smallest and largest numbers for the 
congested cases being approximately 0.5%. For the supplier 
however, the surpluses vary considerably. Since the individual 
nodal prices vary considerably for the different solutions 
considered, see also the following Tables X and XI, this will 
be so also for other agents. 
 
TABLE IX 
SOCIAL SURPLUS AND PRODUCER SURPLUS AT REFERENCE BUS (€) 
 
 AC DC (1) DC (2) 
34067 34149 34139 Case 
A 727 709 735 
34020 34103 34128 Case 
B 472 478 622 
34011 34097 34113 Case 
C 469 483 611 
33952 34112 34088 Case 
D 643 671 673  
 
TABLE X 
COMPARISON OF AC NODAL PRICES 
 
Nodal prices, AC (ct/kWh) Bus 
 Case A Case B Case C Case D 
1 2.9296 2.9340 2.9956 2.7780 
2 2.9527 3.1140 2.9956 2.7780 
3 2.9427 3.2570 3.2620 3.5860 
4 2.9565 2.7890 2.7870 2.7780 
5 2.9633 3.1680 3.1720 3.9320 
6 2.9526 3.4030 3.4100 3.9320 
7 2.9530 2.3800 2.3720 2.7780 
8 2.9609 3.6250 3.6360 4.3500 
9 2.9683 3.5590 3.6090 3.9320 
10 2.9680 3.5450 3.5540 3.9320 
 
 
TABLE XI 
DEVIATIONS OF DC NET PRICES FROM AC NODAL PRICES 
 
Difference: net price DC –  
nodal price AC (ct/kWh) Bus 
 Case C loss components 
as loss factors 
Case D 
loss components 
as loss factors 
Case D 
randomly chosen 
loss components 
1 -0.0534 0.0574 -0.0464 
2 0.0724 0.0483 0.0091 
3 -0.0850 -0.3049 -0.3900 
4 0.0015 0.0541 0.2036 
5 -0.0741 -0.4635 -0.2620 
6 -0.1092 -0.4583 -0.3407 
7 0.0370 0.0600 0.0647 
8 -0.1386 -0.6479 -0.7930 
9 -0.1376 -0.4571 -0.4980 
10 -0.1298 -0.4582 -0.2620  
 
Table X sums up the prices for the different congestion 
management methods, all based on AC-OPF, while Table XI 
shows the deviations of the net DC-prices from the nodal 
prices based on AC for the zonal pricing cases. For case D, 
both prices based on AC loss factors and randomly chosen 
loss components are exhibited. The price differences that can 
be found from Table X, and that are exhibited in Table XI, 
show that the introduction of zonal pricing have profound 
effects on prices, but they also show that the sequential 
pricing procedure, with announced loss factors and prices 
determined by DC computations, have similar effects, even if 
the AC loss factors are used. A general comparison between 
the four cases, when randomly chosen loss factors are used, is 
not proper. In this case, an average deviation resulting from a 
set of random loss factors would be a more appropriate 
approach. 
The comparisons lead to the conclusion that the more 
administrative rules that are incorporated, such as loss factors 
and zonal pricing intensity, the larger are the deviations from 
the AC nodal prices. The analysis of the paper also highlights 
that it is possible to use alternative zonal pricing schemes, for 
instance based on AC-OPF, that are more in accordance with 
the real systems, but at the same time have only a few prices, 
and thus the same perceived simplicity for the market 
participants, as zonal prices based on the DC-approximation 
have. 
V.  CONCLUSIONS 
In practical implementations of marginal cost transmission 
pricing, a number of approximations may be used in the 
process of finding prices for different locations taking into 
account the limits of the grid. This is so for the Nordic power 
market and, more specifically, the Norwegian market, where 
prices are influenced by the market clearing procedures at 
Nord Pool, as well as by the tariffs for marginal losses, that 
are determined by the Norwegian system operator. The focus 
of this paper has been to investigate a stepwise procedure 
inspired by the Norwegian transmission pricing rules, with ex 
ante announcement of loss factors and zonal pricing for 
congestion management. 
In pursuing this goal the nodal prices are decomposed to 
find a loss factor for each node relative to a reference node. 
Moreover, a methodology for computing equal nodal prices 
using AC-OPF for nodes that belong to the same zone is 
developed. Based on loss factors from the AC model or, 
alternatively, randomly generated loss factors, a stepwise 
procedure is employed, highlighting the effects on the 
locational prices of the approximations for different cases of 
congestion and zonal pricing intensity. The approximations 
may have considerable effects on the final locational prices, 
and although the social surpluses have been computed, and 
show to be fairly stable, the individual nodal prices are not, 
thereby affecting to a great extent the surplus of the individual 
agents. 
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VI.  APPENDIX 
TABLE A1 
DATA OF THE 10-BUS SYSTEM 
 
Lines r [p.u.] x [p.u.] b [p.u.] 
Transfer 
capacity 
[MVA] 
1-2,1-4,2-3, 
2-5,3-6,4-5, 
5-7,6-8 
 
0.0034 0.0360 1.2696 800 
4-7,5-6,8-10 0.0028 0.0288 1.0156 800 
5-8,7-8,8-9 0.0017 0.0180 0.6348 800 
6-10,9-10 0.0024 0.0252 0.8888 800 
 
TABLE A2 
BID OFFERS OF MARKET PARTICIPANTS FOR THE 10-BUS TEST SYSTEM 
 
Bus Art max
P  
[MW] 
maxp  
[ct/kWh] 
1 Supplier 150 3 
2,4 Supplier 150 6 
7 Supplier 250 9 
5,6,9,10 Consumer 100 20 
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